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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
term fetus and finally to an embryo, and also a wrongful death
action 9 for such injury.
Standard of Care
A landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to protect
invitiees, not only against riskis incident to the former's activities, but against hazards incident to the condition of the
premises. 20 The one in posses'sion of land owes the affirmative duty
to inspect his premises and either make them safe or give adequate
warning,21so that an invitee may judge and see if he wishes to assume
the risk.
Although there is a conflict 22 among the states on the question
whether a municipal corporation in the maintenance of parks as
places of recreation is discharging a governmental duty or a 2quasi1
corporate one, it is settled in New York that it is the latter.
With these rules in mind, we should conclude that a municipality stands on the same basis as a private land owner in regard
to the duty of care required in the operation of a park. Moreover,
there should be no need to categorize a situation as involving a
special relationship. The normal rules of negligence should apply,
and the duty should arise, not out of any anachronistic relationship, but out of defendant's conduct likely to affect the interests
of the plaintiff.
24
In Caldwell v. ' llage of Island Park, the plaintiff sued the
village for negligence in permitting fireworks on a city owned
owned and operated beach after the hour when admission ceased
to be charged and supervision provided. Admission was charged
from 9:00 A. M. to 6:00 P. M.,. and from 6:00 P.M. to 11:00 P. M.
the public is admitted free, but lifeguards were not provided.
Plaintiff was injured by fireworks set-off by some third person
after 6:00 P. Al. There was evidence that on the two previous
days people had complained of fireworks to the lifeguards. The
court held (4-3) that the village owed a duty to the plaintiff and
was negligent in so far as the plaintiff was injured by the third
person's setting off fireworks.
19. DECEDE-NT ESTATE LAW § 130.
20. Mappv. Saenger Theaters, Inc., 40 F. 2d 19 (5th Cir. 1930).
21. Haefeli v. Wdodrich Engineering Co., 255 N. Y. 442, 175 N. E. 123 (1931).
22. See Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928).
23. Collentine v. City of New York, 279 N. Y. 119, 17 N. E. 2d 792 (1938);
Ehrgott v. New York. 96 N. Y. 264 (1884).
24. 304 N. Y. 268, 107 N. E. 2d 441 (1952y, revfg 279 App. Div. 746, 108 N. Y. S.
2d 334 (2d Dep't 1951).
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The majority assumed that the plaintiff was an invitee even25
though no admission was charged, citing Fritz v. City of Buffalo
and Col~entine v. City of New York." This characterization of
the plaintiff is justified on two bases. First, in the operation of
a public park by a municipality there is some element of invitation
in the common meaning of that word: "To induce or tempt by
encouraging.'12 7 Second, the fact that a fee was charged until
6:00 P. M. tends to make plaintiff at least a quasi-invitee. Thus'
as an invitee, plaintiff was owed the duty to be warned of dangerous activities or unsafe conditions.28 The dangerous activities
referred to are those of the defendant. 9 It was unnecessary for
the Court to say that a municipality owes a greater duty to invitees
of public parks than a private land owner does to a trespasser
or licensee. If the plaintiff is an invitee, then it follows, both by
normal rules of negligence and by special rules applicable to land
owners, that a higher duty will be owed than if plaintiff were a
trespasser or licensee.
The dissenters were troubled by the fact that the municipality
was being held liable for the acts of a third person. Actually, it
was not being held liable for the third person's acts, but rather for
its own failure to provide a warning or supervision after it learned
that dangerous and illegalP0 acts were being conducted on its land.
The Court, of course, spoke in traditional terms. Although a
city is not an insurer of the safety of persons who make use of its
park facilities, it is required to exercise reasonable care in the
maintenance of its parks and in the supervision of their use by
the public.3 ' Here, no supervision at all was provided after 6:00
P. A., when the "accident" occurred. Ergo, reasonable care was
not exercised. This, it is clear, is not different from the normal
rule of reasonable care under the circumstances. The Court further spoke in terms of the condition of the park. It declared that
the mere setting off of fireworks was sufficient to create an unsafe
condition of the premises, thus creating2 liability for failure to
warn when the defendant had knowledge.
25. 277 N. Y. 710, 14 N. E. 2d 815 (1938).
26. Siupra n. 23; see also, 22 A. L. R. 629.
27. WEBSTER'S NEW IhTERNATIONAL DICToOARY, (2d ed. 1950).

28. Supra n. 21.
29. Ibid.

§ 1894 (a).
288 N. Y. 62, 41 N. E. 2d 459 (1942).
Buffalo,
of
v.
City
31. Clark
32. Supra n. 5.

30. N. Y. PENAL LAw
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The court leaned toward the modern tendency to abolish rules
of special relationship and instead to apply the general rules of
negligence.
Causation
An essential element of an actionable tort is causation
in fact; it must appear that the defendant's acts were the
actual cause of the harm in question.8 3 The historical test for
causation has been the "but for" or sine qua no* rule. By this
test consequences are in fact caused by defendant's conduct if
they would not have happened but for such conduct.84 The "but
for" test works affirmatively to establish cause in fact, but not
always does it disestablish the causal relation. The rule fails
where two causes could have brought about the event, each without the other. In such a case, some different rule must be used:
The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material
element.and a substantial factor in bringing it about. 5 This is a
question of fact; and one on which any layman is quite as competent to sit in judgment as -the most experienced court. If the
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, it follows that he will not be absolved from responsibility merely because other causes contributed to the result."
If, as a matter of ordinary experience, a particular act or omission
might be expected under the circumstances to produce a particular
result, and that result in fact has followed, the conclusion may be
permissible that the casual relation exists. It is enough that the
plaintiff introduces evidence from which reasonable men may conclude that it is more probable than hot that the event was caused
by the defendant.
The Court of Appeals in Dunham 'v. Village of Canisteo8" used
the "substantial factor" analysis in finding that it was a question
for the jury "whether or not defendant's negligence was a competent producing cause of

.

.

.

the death

.

33. Causation in fact, or cause and effect, is not to be confused with proximate
or legal cause, which is the limitation courts have been compelled to place, as practical
necessity, upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of his act. Comstock v.
Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931). Before any question of proximate or
legal cause may arise, there must be cause and effect.
34. See Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. Rnv. 103, 106, 109
(1911).
35. RESTAtemENT, TORTS§ 431.
36. This is not what might have caused the plaintiff's harm, but what did in fact
cause it. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARv. L. REv. 633, 638
(1920).
37. 303 N. Y. 498, 104 N. E. 2d 872 (1952), rev'g 278 App. Div. 743, 103 N. Y. S.
2d 519 (4th Dep't 1951).
38. 303 N. Y. 498, 506, 104 N. E. 2d 872, 877 (1952).
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